Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A cross-country analysis by Ezcurra, Roberto & Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés
SERC DISCUSSION PAPER 25
Does Decentralization Matter for
Regional Disparities?
A Cross-Country Analysis
Andres Rodríguez-Pose (SERC, London School of Economics)
Roberto Ezcurra (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Publica
de Navarra)
July 2009
This work was part of the research programme of the independent UK Spatial 
Economics Research Centre funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG), and the Welsh Assembly 
Government. The support of the funders is acknowledged. The views expressed are 
those of the authors and do not represent the views of the funders. 
 
© A. Rodríguez-Pose and R. Ezcurra, submitted 2009 
Does Decentralization Matter for Regional Disparities? 
 
 





























* SERC, Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics 




The authors are grateful to Ramiro Gil Serrate for his work in the compilation and setting up 
of the database. The research has been financed by the Centro Internacional de Estudios 
Economicos y Sociales (CIEES). It is also part of the research programme of the independent 
UK Spatial Economics Research Centre funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC), Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Communities 
and Local Government, and the Welsh Assembly Government. The support of these funders 
is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the funders. 
Abstract  
This paper looks at the relationship between fiscal and political decentralization and the 
evolution of regional inequalities in a panel of 26 countries – 19 developed and 7 developing 
– for the period between 1990 and 2006. Using an instrumental variables method, it finds that 
whereas for the whole sample decentralization is completely dissociated for the evolution of 
regional disparities, the results are highly contingent on the level of development, the existing 
level of territorial inequalities, and the fiscal redistributive capacity of the countries in the 
sample. Decentralization in high income countries has, if anything, been associated with a 
reduction of regional inequality. In low and medium income countries, fiscal decentralization 
has been associated with a significant rise in regional disparities, which the positive effects of 
political decentralization have been unable to compensate. Policy preferences by subnational 
governments for expenditure in economic affairs, education, and social protection have 
contributed to this trend.  
 
JEL Classifications: H11, H71, R11 
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Over the last forty years a decentralizing wave has swept the world. Whereas in the 
early 1970s the number of truly decentralized countries – not including those that were 
only decentralized on paper – was rather limited, decentralization is now an essential 
feature of political regimes the world over. It has been at the centre of policy 
transformations not only in developed countries, but also in many developing and 
transition economies in Asia, Latin America, and Africa (Bardhan, 2002: 185). The 
decentralization process is still in full swing (Marks, Hooghe and Schakel, 2008), with 
subnational movements, national governments, and international organisations alike 
often acclaiming the virtues and benefits of decentralized governments (e.g. Burki, 
Perry and Dillinger, 1999; World Bank, 2000). 
 
The political rationale for decentralization has also evolved, shifting from an emphasis 
on cultural, ethnic, linguistic, or religious factors, to one of achieving economic and 
social change. Decentralization has been increasingly sold by powerful central elites, as 
well as by a growing raft of nationalist and regionalist groups, as a way to attain greater 
efficiency and competitiveness and to accomplish a better insertion into a globalised 
world (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008: 66). The view of decentralization has thus 
shifted from that of an instrument to avoid homogenisation and economic change to that 
of a vehicle to achieve it (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005: 407-8). 
 
Yet, so far, the overall implications of decentralization for economic development are 
poorly understood. There is an important gap in the literature, as the studies that have 
tried to venture into the economic implications of decentralization 1) are few and far 
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between;  2) often focus on individual case studies; and 3) generally reach contradictory 
conclusions. Many questions thus remain unanswered. Is it true that decentralization 
generates what Morgan (2002) calls an ‘economic dividend’? Does it lead to greater 
economic efficiency and growth? Is it associated to a lowering or rising of economic 
disparities? In particular, this last question – despite some notable exceptions that have 
mainly focused on the impact of decentralization on regional inequalities in specific 
countries – has either been fundamentally overlooked by the literature or too easily 
dismissed on the basis that decentralized political structures not only lead to smaller 
governments, but also to “a less-developed welfare state, and, consequently, higher 
levels of inequality” (Beramendi, 2007: 783). 
 
This paper addresses the question of what have been the implications of the recent trend 
towards decentralization for the evolution of territorial inequalities across twenty-six 
developed and transition and/or developing countries across the world. More precisely, 
it aims to improve our understanding about whether the global transfer of authority and 
resources to subnational tiers of government may yield different results in terms of 
territorial equity in the developed and the less developed worlds and across countries 
which have diverse histories and levels of decentralization and which have adopted 
different paths towards it. 
 
The key hypothesis driving the paper is that while, on the whole, the positive and 
negative effects of fiscal and political decentralization may offset one another, capacity 
and financial resource constraints and weaker endowments in the poorer regions of 
lower income countries may exacerbate the negative impact of decentralization on 
territorial inequality. Less developed countries with already existing high territorial 
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imbalances will, as a consequence, tend to exhibit growing inequalities once they 
decentralize, while the effect of decentralization in the developed world may be either 
neutral or even contribute to a reduction of regional disparities. 
 
In order to address whether this is the case, the paper first looks at the spatial 
implications of decentralization, focusing initially on how the process of 
decentralization has acquired global dimensions, before concentration on the theoretical 
links between decentralization and territorial inequalities. Section 3 presents the model 
and the data and comments on the empirical results of regressing fiscal and political 
decentralization on the evolution of regional inequalities. It also looks how different 
choices in types of expenditure by subnational governments may have affected regional 
economic trajectories and disparities. The final section concludes. 
 
2. The spatial implications of decentralization 
 
2.1. Decentralization as a global trend 
 
In contrast to the situation in the early 1970s, when most countries were centralized 
nation-states, today “some 95 percent of democracies […] have elected subnational 
governments, and countries everywhere – large and small, rich and poor – are devolving 
political, fiscal, and administrative powers to subnational tiers of government” (World 
Bank, 2000: 107). The trend towards decentralization has been relentless and 
widespread among most large countries in the world, regardless of their level of 
development1. 
                                                 
1In an analysis of regional authority trends in 42 countries between 1950 and 2006, 
Marks, Hooghe and Schakel find that the process of decentralization has been “one-
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Within the developed world, there is virtually no large country that has not witnessed 
some degree of decentralization over the last four decades.  In Europe – on top of the 
already federalized Austria, Germany, and Switzerland – Belgium, Italy, and Spain have 
introduced widespread reforms in order to enhance regional autonomy. France and 
Poland have taken more limited steps towards regionalisation, with the creation of 
regions and directly elected assemblies. And the UK and Portugal – together with Spain 
and Italy – have opted for asymmetrical forms of devolution and transferred a 
considerable amount of powers to some of their regions (Hooghe, Schakel and Marks, 
2008). Many countries in central Europe engaged in significant decentralization on or 
before their accession to the EU, with some already embarking on a ‘second generation’ 
of reforms since transition (Hooghe, Schakel and Marks, 2008). A number of transition 
countries throughout eastern Europe and central Asia have also decentralized (Dabla-
Norris, 2006: 104).  
 
Moves towards even greater decentralization have also been common among nation-
states which enjoyed significant subnational autonomy before the onset of globalization. 
In the US, for example, the trend towards centralization, which some trace back to the 
American Civil War or to the Great Depression, was turned on its head by Reagan’s 
New Federalism in the 1980s, when states began to recover greater freedom of action 
(Donahue, 1997). The powers of US states have continued to grow under both 
Democratic and Republican administrations in the 1990s and 2000s. Australia and 
                                                                                                                                               
sided over quite an extended period of time” (Marks, Hooghe and Schakel, 2008: 170).  
Only two of the 42 countries considered witnessed some level of recentralization, while 
29 saw an increase in regional autonomy.  In addition, 89% of the 384 reforms 
examined resulted in an expansion of regional authority. 
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Canada have equally experienced modest increases to their already significant levels of 
decentralization (Hooghe, Schakel and Marks, 2008).  
 
The true global nature of the phenomenon is in evidence when the trends towards 
subnational autonomy in the developing world are taken into consideration. Among the 
low and middle income countries in Asia, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam, among others, have undertaken significant leaps towards regional autonomy. 
These changes have ranged from radical reforms of the state, as in the case of the 1999 
decentralization of Indonesia (Aspinall and Berger, 2001), to gradual de facto 
transformations of the relationship between the centre and the regions, as has been the 
case in China, where regional and local governments enjoy high levels of economic and 
fiscal autonomy (Ma, 1996: 5). India, a federal state since independence, has undergone 
a new wave of decentralization since 1992 (Sharma, 1999; Bagchi, 2003).  
 
In Latin America, many of the countries that were decentralized on paper have also 
undergone profound transformations. This is, for example, the case of Mexico, which 
witnessed a renewal of federalism in the 1990s (Rodríguez, 1998; Ward and Rodríguez, 
1999), or of Brazil, where the 1988 constitution afforded states a hitherto unprecedented 
level of autonomy (Coutinho, 1996; Dillinger and Webb). Even sub-Saharan Africa, 
long regarded as a strong bastion of centralism, has undergone significant 
transformations in its territorial organisation. Extensive transfers of powers to 
subnational tiers of government have taken place in South Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria, 
while most other countries within sub-Saharan Africa have experimented with different 
levels of regional autonomy, with moderate to far-reaching transfers of powers and 
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resources to subnational tiers of government occurring in at least thirteen of them 
(Ndegwa, 2002).  
  
2.2 Decentralization and territorial inequalities 
 
The recent global drive towards decentralization has been, to a large extent, based on a 
different rationale than previous decentralization trends (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 
2008). While traditionally the transfer of powers and resources to subnational tiers of 
government was justified on identity grounds – i.e. the need to preserve a distinct 
cultural, linguistic, historical, or religious traditions within large and heterogeneous 
states (Hechter, 1975; Horowitz, 1985; de Winter and Türsan, 1998; Moreno, 2001) – 
the recent wave of decentralization has, according to the ‘new regionalist’ literature in 
political science, tended to be justified on the grounds of a supposed greater capacity of 
subnational governments to overcome the failures of the centralized state (Bardhan, 
2002: 185) and to deliver improved economic efficiency (Keating, 1998; Morgan, 
2002).  
 
The supposed superior economic efficiency of decentralized governments rests on the 
basic tenets of the fiscal federalism literature. Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) posit 
that the transfer of authority and resources to subnational tiers of government leads to a 
double improvement in efficiency. The first and perhaps most important economic 
advantage associated with decentralized governments is their capacity to match public 
spending better to the heterogeneous preferences of individuals living in different 
territories, thus enhancing the allocative efficiency of government. The second 
advantage of decentralization lies in its capacity to mobilize underused resources and in 
the competition it creates among subnational governments in order to deliver better 
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policies. Mobilizing resources to their full potential and greater competition among 
jurisdictions may result in a more efficient provision of public goods and services and in 
greater policy innovation, thus increasing the overall productive efficiency of an 
economy (Oates, 1996).  
 
Yet, the enthusiasm for the positive economic implications of political decentralization 
is often tempered by the belief that the distribution of its benefits is geographically 
uneven and that “unfettered fiscal decentralization is likely to lead to a concentration of 
resources in a few geographical locations and thus increase fiscal disparities across 
subnational governments” (Martínez-Vázquez and McNab 2003: 1605). Despite some 
claims that decentralization is associated with a general reduction in territorial 
disparities (e.g. Weingast, 1995; McKinnon, 1997; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Shankar 
and Shah, 2003, Gil, Pascual and Rapún, 2004), the prevailing view is that the transfer 
of powers and resources to subnational tiers of government disproportionally benefits 
those regions with a greater capacity to really fulfil allocative and productive efficiency, 
i.e. the most prosperous regions, with better socio-economic endowments and better 
institutions (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996). In addition, as decentralization undermines 
the power of the central state to play an equalising role, it may lead to a transfer of 
economic development from the peripheries to the cores (Prud’homme, 1995; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2004). Hence the widespread perception that decentralization 
and greater territorial inequalities are the two sides of the same coin and that “there is 
clearly a tension between pursuing goals of equality in service provision and greater 
decentralization and choice” (Besley and Ghatak, 2003: 245). 
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The mechanisms through which decentralization may result in greater territorial 
disparities are, according to Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2005), of an economic and 
political nature. From an economic perspective, the differences in institutional 
capacities and socio-economic endowments among regions within any given country 
may undermine the potential benefits associated with the better matching of policies to 
local needs and the greater territorial competition associated with decentralization. In 
the cases of regions with pockets of extreme poverty, where basic necessities need to be 
covered, decentralization may not mean a better matching of the provision of goods and 
services to the preferences of the population, but simply a different and perhaps a less 
efficient way – because of the loss of economies of scale – of delivering basic goods 
and services (Prud’homme, 1995). In most other cases, weaker and often times more 
corrupt institutions, lower access to capital, smaller tax bases, and weaker 
infrastructural, educational, and technological endowments represent a serious handicap 
for poorer regions within any given country in order to deliver greater allocative and 
productive efficiency through decentralization. This may also mean that the poorer a 
region or a subnational state, the weaker its capacity to compete for the attraction of 
capital, foreign direct investment, or talent. And less capital, investment, and talent 
automatically implies a lower capacity to innovate. Hence, under a more decentralized 
regime, it is often assumed that the playing field is not level and that the poorer and less 
well endowed regions face significant constraints that would prevent them from 
delivering and innovating in the same way as their richer counterparts, thereby 
perpetuating pre-existing patterns of disparities in the provision of goods and services 
and in wealth. 
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From a more political perspective, decentralization may imply a reduction of the 
influence of poorer regions and states over the allocation of financial resources and 
transfers. Decentralization entails granting subnational governments a greater say over 
policy-making and over the collection and distribution of financial resources. The 
transfer of financial powers to subnational governments is likely to create inequities 
among richer and poorer regions both immediately after the transfer of powers and in 
the medium and long-term. In the short term, the transfer of the powers to tax 
downwards from the central state will yield greater rewards to territories with a more 
developed economic fabric and thus a greater tax base. In the medium and long-term a 
more dynamic and subtle mechanism of political influence may kick in and contribute 
to perpetuate and enhance existing territorial disparities. The process of decentralization 
will almost certainly unleash a competition for the scarce resources emanating from the 
central government, with subnational authorities bidding for an ever greater share of the 
national economic cake. Hence, the central government is likely to find itself at the 
heart of “conflicting demands of states that are competing for its patronage” 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005: 412). However, the playing field in this competition 
for resources is not level, with richer, stronger, and/or larger states likely to wield a 
greater influence over central decision-making than lagging, poor, or remote states. 
Such influence can be used in order to extract a more discretionary allocation of funds 
from the central government, to the detriment of formula-based solutions – which are 
more likely to be favourable to those territories with greater needs or endowment 
shortages – as has been the case in Mexico or to try to modify formula-based systems 
with the introduction of criteria and indicators more favourable to the richer regions, as 
in the recent negotiations to transfer financial autonomy to Spanish regions. This, in 
turn, will undermine the redistributive capability of the state and leave regions in the 
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periphery more exposed and vulnerable under what can become a territorially regressive 
financial system, as was observed in Brazil (Dillinger and Webb, 1999) or in India (Rao 
and Singh, 2007) . 
 
There are, however, circumstances where it can be envisaged that greater 
decentralization may contribute to reduce, rather than increase, territorial inequalities. 
First, the transfer of authority and resources to subnational governments is likely to 
generate greater transparency and bring to light differences in the provision of goods 
and services across jurisdictions, putting both subnational governments and the central 
government under pressure in order to a) deliver more efficient goods and services and 
b) equalise towards a maximum common denominator the provision of those goods and 
services within any given country. Decentralization in Canada, for example, which 
initially led to the establishment of a more progressive and egalitarian welfare state in 
Québec in comparison to other Provinces, may have later “contributed to strengthening 
social protection elsewhere in Canada” (Béland and Lecours, 2009: 22).  
 
Decentralization is also about promoting efficiency everywhere. Local and regional 
governments mobilize local resources with the aim of delivering greater allocative and 
productive efficiency. The use of a territory’s endogenous potential varies significantly 
from one place to another. If we assume that more advanced regions are closer to using 
their full economic potential or, in other words, to their economic frontier, then the 
margin of improvement will be greater in less developed areas. Under these 
circumstances, decentralization may be a catalyst for economic convergence. The 
transfer of authority and resources to subnational tiers of government also generates a 
series of incentives for competition that may also contribute to equalize regional 
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standards of living and wealth. In democratic systems, subnational governments have 
strong incentives to deliver greater growth and to achieve levels of development similar 
to those of the most developed regions within any nation-state in order to be able to 
convince the electorate to vote for them to remain in power (Weingast, 1995; Qian and 
Weingast, 1997; Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008). This incentive is greater for less developed 
regions within any given national context, who may resort to greater fiscal competition 
or more flexible labour markets than their richer counterparts (McKinnon, 1997; 
Shankar and Shah, 2003). However, the objectives of equalizing the provision of public 
goods to the maximum common denominator with the need to compete on fiscal 
grounds and more flexible labour markets may be hard to reconcile in the absence of a 
very strong redistribution of funds by the central government and in the presence of 
strong regulatory systems. 
 
One aspect that has been often overlooked is the fact that the factors that may push 
decentralized regimes towards greater or lower territorial inequality are likely to operate 
differently in diverse economic environments. Hence while many of the assumptions 
that link decentralization to greater territorial inequality may be valid for poorer 
countries with high existing territorial disparities and weak institutions, this may not be 
the case in richer, more equal, and more institutionally developed environments. 
Developed countries are not only wealthier than developing ones, they also have 
significantly lower territorial inequalities2. Therefore, while the capacity constraints that 
                                                 
2
 In our sample, the lowest territorial disparities in 2004-2005 – measured by the 
population-weighted coefficient of variation – are found in the US. Most of the 
developed countries in the sample have levels of disparities that did not exceed two 
times those of the US in that year. In contrast, in the developing world, disparities were 
3.2 times higher in Brazil, 3.4 times higher in India, 3.8 times higher in South Africa, 
4.5 times higher in China and Mexico, and 8.6 times higher in Thailand than in the US. 
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are at the base of the link between decentralization and growing regional inequalities are 
certainly an important issue in relatively poor and unequal countries across the 
developing world, they may not matter significantly in the developed world. The 
governments of the poorest regions in Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, or Thailand are 
much more likely to face serious institutional constraints than those of São Paulo, 
Mexico City, Gauteng, or Bangkok. First, because of the need to cover basic necessities 
in their constituencies, they may be forced to spend their scarce resources on delivering 
basic goods and services, rather than on tailoring policies to the specific preferences of 
their populations. Hence, the choice that is at the base of the fiscal federalism theories 
will not apply in the peripheral areas of the developing world. Second, these regions are 
more likely to suffer from institutional problems, such as weaker, more corrupt, and less 
transparent organisations (Martínez-Vázquez and McNab, 2003). Local and regional 
governments in these areas may be more prone to capture by local elites than 
government in richer regions or the national government. As Bardhan (2002: 194) 
indicates “in situations of high inequality, collusion may be easier to organize and 
enforce in small proximate groups involving officials, politicians, contractors and 
interest groups; risks of being caught and reported are easier to manage, and the 
multiplex interlocking social and economic relationships among local influential people 
may act as formidable barriers to entry into these cozy rental havens”. And weaker and 
more corrupt institutions will, in turn, negatively affect the incentives to respond and 
promote efficient policies at the local level (Bonet, 2006: 662). Local governments are 
also likely to attract less qualified people than governments in core areas, as migration 
trends towards the core would have already creamed off some of the most able and 
better qualified individuals. They will also be less likely to compete on a level playing 
field as only territories with good institutions, accessibility and infrastructure, and an 
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investor-friendly environment will succeed in generating and attracting private 
investment (Bagchi, 2003: 34). In addition, poorer and more agricultural regions will 
have to rely more on levies and compulsory apportionment in order to raise funds, 
further limiting their economic growth potential (Kanbur and Zhang 2005: 92). Finally, 
as a consequence of the presence of a weaker civil society and of lower public spending 
and less developed or even absent territorial redistribution and equitable territorial 
transfer systems, the influence that lagging regions may exert over the political process 
and the territorial distribution of funds may be limited or even waning (Bonet, 2006: 
672). 
 
These factors need not necessarily apply in the developed world. Although the gap in 
development between West Virginia or Mississippi, on the one hand, and Connecticut 
or California, on the other, may be considered as significant, it is not necessarily the 
case that state governments in West Virginia or Mississippi may not have the capacity 
to implement their own autonomous policies that reflect the preferences of their citizens 
and may not be able to attract suitably qualified personnel. Given the well-established 
territorial checks and balances of the US government system, these states may even 
have greater per capita political influence than some of their richer and most prosperous 
counterparts on how federal funds are distributed. And in none of these states would the 
state government be concerned in the same way as in the developing world with 
covering the basic necessities of the population. The same is valid in virtually all 
regions in the developed world. As a consequence, any negative association between 
decentralization and devolution of regional disparities will be much more prominent in 
the developing world than in developed countries. In the latter, because of the presence 
of strong redistribution regimes associated with high levels of government expenditure, 
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the effect is likely to be neutral or even perhaps mildly positive (Ezcurra and Pascual 
2008). Following Beramendi (2007: 786), it may not be the case that it is 
“decentralization that causes inequality, but rather pre-existing economic inequalities 
that drive the decentralization of the welfare state, which in turn reproduces the pre-
existing patterns of inequality”. 
 
The empirical evidence regarding the connection between decentralization and the 
evolution of regional disparities is, as mentioned in the introduction, scarce and 
inconclusive. Among the studies which have focused on individual country cases, most 
tend to find a positive relationship between decentralization and regional disparities. 
Bagchi (2003) for the case of India, Bonet (2006) for Colombia, Hill (2008) for 
Indonesia, Silva (2005) and Hill (2008) for the Philippines, Pike and Tomaney (2009) 
for the UK, Warner and Pratt (2005) for the US, and West and Wong (1995),  Tsui 
(1993), Chen and Fleischer (1996), Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2002), Kanbur and Zhang 
(2005), Qiao, Martínez-Vázquez and Xu (2008) for China all find that moves towards 
decentralization have been accompanied by an increase of territorial disparities. The 
number of single country studies that find that decentralization is either unrelated or 
indeed associated with a decrease in regional inequalities is far more limited. These 
include Calamai (2009) for Italy and Lee (1995) or Wei and Wu (2001) for China. 
Studies using cross country data reach similarly incomplete conclusions. Among those 
dealing with the developed world, Gil, Pascual and Rapún (2004) and Ezcurra and 
Pascual (2008) find that decentralization has contributed to an increase regional 
convergence. Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2004), in a study that covers both countries in 
the developed and developing worlds, find mixed evidence depending on the countries, 
but a prevailing tendency for the devolution of political and fiscal powers to be 
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associated with increasing disparities. In the end, all these studies either cover a limited 
range of country cases – and fundamentally China – or, in the case of the cross-country 
studies, a small subset of fundamentally developed countries. They also reach far too 
contradictory results for any clear pattern to emerge. However, by and large and in 
accordance with our hypothesis, the majority of the studies focusing on the developing 
world tend to find a positive association between decentralization and territorial 
disparities, while the evidence from studies covering countries in the developed world is 
much more mixed. 
 
3. The link between decentralization and regional inequalities 
 
In this paper we revisit the link between fiscal and political decentralization and within 
country regional disparities, using a set of 26 countries. We pay special attention to how 
decentralization processes may operate differently in the developed and developing 
world, as, as stated in our hypothesis, we expect the implications of decentralization for 
regional disparities to differ according to the level of wealth and economic development 
of individual countries. As far as we are aware, no study has to date empirically 
investigated this possibility. 
 
3.1. Model  
 
In order to measure our dependent variable, the level and evolution of regional 
inequalities within each country, we resort to the population-weighted coefficient of 
variation. This measure of dispersion, which is widely used in the literature on regional 
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disparities (e.g. Williamson, 1965; Petrakos, Rodríguez-Pose and Rovolis, 2005; 

















            (1) 
where ity  and itp  denote the GDP per capita and population share of region i in country 







= ∑ . The advantage of this inequality measure vis-à-
vis other potential alternative measures of inequality is that it is independent of scale 
and population size, and satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Cowell, 1995). 
Likewise, c takes into account the differences in population size across the various 
territorial units considered. This aspect has traditionally been overlooked by the 
literature on economic convergence that has flourished since the contributions of Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992), despite the fact that, as noted by Petrakos, Rodríguez-
Pose and Rovolis (2005), omitting population size may greatly distort our perceptions of 
spatial inequality.  
 
Measuring our key independent variable, the degree of fiscal decentralization of a 
country, is much more controversial for two reasons. First, the devolution of fiscal 
power from central to regional and local governments is a complex and 
multidimensional process (Martínez-Vázquez and McNab, 2003; Schneider, 2003). 
Second, no single indicator is able to adequately capture the real level of fiscal 
decentralization of a country (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). The indicator we use as a proxy 
for the level of fiscal decentralization of the countries considered is the subnational 
share in total government expenditure, which has been widely employed by the 
literature (e.g. Oates, 1985, 1993; Davoodi and Zou, 1998). This indicator has, however, 
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come under strong criticism for failing to identify the degree of expenditure autonomy 
of subnational governments, for failing to differentiate between tax and non-tax revenue 
sources, and for its inability to capture the proportion of intergovernmental transfers that 
are discretionary or conditional (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Rodden, 2004; Stegarescu, 
2005). For large cross-country comparisons, as Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2004) 
acknowledge, there is nevertheless a lack of reliable alternatives, making the 
subnational share in total government expenditure probably the best available 
quantitative indicator. With the exception of Gil, Pascual, and Rapún (2004), all 
existing cross-country analyses on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
regional disparities employ this measure, which facilitates the comparison of our results 
with those obtained previously in other studies.  
 
Another handicap linked to the use of this proxy of fiscal decentralization is the scarcity 
of homogeneous and reliable cross-country data. This limits considerably the number of 
countries that can be included in this type of analysis. Our sample covers a total of 26 
countries for which complete sets of data on regional GDP per capita and subnational 
share in total government expenditure are available (Table 1). This is however a larger 
sample than those employed by earlier works on the topic3.  
 
In order to try to overcome some of the problems of using the subnational share in total 
government expenditure as a proxy of fiscal decentralization and to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the actual powers of subnational governments, we introduce 
an indicator of political decentralization. Political decentralization has to do with the 
power of subnational governments to undertake the political functions of governance 
                                                 
3See the Appendix for a full description on the sources of the data used in the paper. 
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(Schneider, 2003). However, measuring political decentralization is even more 
controversial than measuring fiscal decentralization, with virtually every researcher who 
has wandered into this field producing his or her own personal index of political 
decentralization4. In addition, political decentralization indices tend to cover a relatively 
small sample of developed countries, often disregard the significant changes in state 
structure in the developing world, and tend to be constrained to specific points in time. 
We use Schneider’s (2003) 1996 political decentralization index, as it is the only one 
that covers all of the countries included in our sample, but which has the drawback of 
only referring to one year during our period of analysis. We also note that, while 
Schneider’s index is broadly in line with other political decentralization indices (see 
Schakel, 2008), most of the countries included in the analysis register significant 
differences between their degree of political and fiscal decentralization, reflecting 
internal legal, political, and de facto discrepancies between the availability of funds for 
subnational governments and the power of these governments to make significant policy 
choices with them.  
 
Taking into account the above discussion, our model adopts the following form: 
ctctcctct PDFDI εγβα ++++= φX                       (2) 
where I is our measure of regional inequality, FD is the indicator of fiscal 
decentralization, PD is Schneider’s indicator of political decentralization, X denotes a 
set of indicators that control for additional factors that are assumed to have an influence 
on regional disparities, and ε  is the corresponding disturbance term.  
                                                
 4
 Please refer to the 2008 special issue of Federal and Regional Studies on “Regional 
Authority in 42 Countries, 1950-2006: A Measure and Five Hypotheses” by Hooghe, 
Marks, and Schakel in order to have a comprehensive view of the difficulties involved 




Our control variables in vector X include the wealth of the country and its size, the level 
of trade openness, whether a country has undergone transition from a socialist to a 
capitalist system, and the redistributive capacity of the state. The wealth of a country is 
proxied by GDP per capita. Since the pioneer work of Williamson (1965), the empirical 
literature on spatial inequality has emphasized the relevance of the level of economic 
development in explaining regional disparities (e.g. Amos, 1988; Terrasi, 1999; 
Petrakos, Rodríguez-Pose and Rovolis, 2005). From a theoretical perspective, it is 
difficult to determine beforehand the final effect of this variable on spatial inequality. 
While some factors such as the existence of diseconomies of agglomeration prevailing 
after some level of concentration, core-periphery spread effects, technological diffusion 
processes, or transport infrastructures that affect the locational choice of private capital, 
suggest that, beyond a certain threshold level, the advances in the economic 
development process may contribute to the spatial dispersion of economic activity 
(Petrakos and Brada, 1989; Thisse, 2000), new economic geography models have 
tended to highlight that economic growth is often associated with an uneven spatial 
development (e.g. Krugman, 1998; Fujita and Thisse, 2002).  
 
Spatial inequality may also be related to country size (Williamson, 1965). Country size 
may hide greater heterogeneity and thus the possibility for subnational governments to 
undertake widely different policies than in smaller, more homogenous and compact 
countries. We use the population of a country as our measure of country size.  
 
The rise in trade over recent decades has also attracted attention as a potential 
contributor to changes in inequality (e.g. Milanovic, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; 
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Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2006). The impact of trade on inequalities is, however, not 
well understood yet. On the one hand, Heckscher-Ohlin type analyses indicate that trade 
contributes to reduce existing disparities, in the cases when capital investment is 
attracted by those regions with the lowest cost base and labour shifts to the highest 
salary zones. On the other, it should not be overlooked that, according to this theory, the 
owners of abundant factors will benefit from trade, while owners of scarce resources 
will experience falling returns, at least in the medium term. Likewise, the models of the 
new economic geography provide different outcomes in relation to the link between 
trade and spatial inequality, depending on the theoretical assumptions employed in each 
case (e.g. Krugman and Livas Elizondo, 1996; Puga and Venables, 1999; Paluzie, 
2001). In view of these considerations, we control our estimations for the possible 
impact on regional disparities of the degree of international trade openness of the 
different countries, measured as the ratio between total trade (exports and imports) and 
GDP. 
 
Transition from real socialism to capitalism is also bound to have affected the location 
of economic activities and thus territorial disparities. As is well-known, throughout the 
1990s, a number of countries around the world – and especially in central and eastern 
Europe (CEE) – underwent profound changes of a political and economic nature as a 
consequence of the processes of restructuring, privatization, and liberalization that 
ensued the fall of communism. Various studies have identified an important increase in 
the level of spatial inequality within the CEE countries during the transition period 
(Petrakos, 2001; Ezcurra and Pascual, 2007) and the changes seem to have mainly 
benefited capital cities and major urban agglomerations (Bachtler, Downes and 
Gorzelak, 1999; Petrakos, 2001). In contrast, most areas specialized in agriculture and 
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manufacturing suffered the negative effects of transition. We thus include a dummy 
variable for the four transition countries of our sample: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania. 
 
Finally, as indicated in the theoretical section, the redistributive capacity of the state is 
likely to affect the level and evolution of territorial disparities within any given country. 
Any observed link between fiscal decentralization and regional disparities may be 
spurious if existing differences in the capacity of the state to redistribute financial 
resources across regions are ignored (Gil, Pascual and Rapún, 2004). Hence we control 
for the size of the public sector, measured as the share of total public expenditure in 
national GDP, as a proxy for the redistributive capacity of the countries in the sample. 
We expect the relationship between public sector expenditure and regional inequalities 
to be negative. 
 
3.2. Data and method 
 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel covering 26 countries. The period of analysis goes 
from 1990 until 2005 and, although data availability is not the same for all countries 
included in the sample, the average number of observations for each country is 14.6, 
from a possible maximum of 16. No country has fewer than 11 time observations (Table 
1). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
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A potentially serious problem when analysing the relationship between subnational 
disparities and fiscal decentralization is the possible existence of endogeneity: 
decentralization may affect the evolution of territorial inequalities and, in turn, be 
affected by them. As is known, the use of endogenous regressors implies that the 
explanatory variables are contemporaneously correlated with the disturbance term, 
affecting the consistency of the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) (Greene, 2003). 
Bearing this in mind, we estimate model (2) using the instrumental variables method 
(IV), with lagged values of the measure of fiscal decentralization as instruments. In 
addition, all the estimates carried out are based on a robust variance matrix estimator 
which is valid in the presence of heteroskedasticity or serial correlation (Wooldridge, 
2002). The use of country-specific effects was also considered. However, the various F-
tests performed indicate that in all cases the country-specific effects are not jointly 
significant, thus justifying the chosen specification. In addition, the absence of country-
specific effects has the advantage of allowing us to introduce time-invariant variables in 
the list of regressors (and notably Schneider’s index of political decentralization). 
Likewise, the inclusion of time-specific effects common to all countries does not 
improve the goodness of fit of model (2)5. 
 
Finally, as the aim of the paper is analysing the changes in the spatial distribution of 
GDP per capita, rather than permanent cross-country differences in the level of regional 
inequality, we normalize the values of the inequality measure employed as dependent 
variable in model (2) by the average inequality registered during the study period in the 
country in question. This normalization, which is also applied to the explanatory 
variables, has the important advantage of avoiding the possible sensitivity of the results 
                                                 
5The results obtained when model (2) is estimated with country and time-specific 
effects are available from the authors upon request. 
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of the analysis to the level of territorial disaggregation used to compute the level of 
regional inequality within each country. 
 
3.3. Empirical results. 
 
The information provided by Table 1 shows that the degree of spatial inequality and 
fiscal decentralization varies considerably across the sample countries. By and large, 
countries with a level of regional disparities above the mean register, on average, a level 
of fiscal decentralization below the mean and vice versa, which raises the possible issue 
of the existence of an inverse relationship between these two variables. In order to 
confirm this finding, we calculate the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between 
the average values of the population-weighted coefficient of variation and the 
subnational share in total government expenditure, obtaining a value of -0.450 (p-value 
= 0.021). This result is in line with the empirical evidence provided previously by 
Shankar and Shah (2003) and Gil, Pascual and Rapún (2004) for different country 
samples. However, this preliminary conclusion should be met with caution, as the 
changes registered by both variables over the study period are not explicitly taken into 
account and the level of spatial inequality within the countries in our sample does not 
depend exclusively on their degree of fiscal decentralization, but on a raft of different 
factors.  
 
In order to asses whether this relationship holds, we run model (2). The results obtained 
when model (2) is estimated show that a substantial proportion of the variation in spatial 
inequality in the countries considered is explained, with adjusted R-squared results 
ranging between 0.5 and 0.73 in different regressions (Table 2).  
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INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The coefficients for the two different decentralization variables indicate the presence of 
a complex and wealth-sensitive relationship between decentralization and regional 
inequalities. Regarding fiscal decentralization, the first two columns of Table 2 denote 
that the coefficient of our measure of fiscal decentralization is not statistically 
significant, suggesting the absence of a link between the devolution of fiscal power 
from central to subnational governments and the evolution of regional disparities. 
However, as was argued in the theoretical section, the possible impact of fiscal 
decentralization may be contingent on the level of development of a country, with 
poorer countries more likely to witness an increase in regional disparities linked to 
fiscal decentralization. This hypothesis is corroborated by the results of the analysis. 
Using the World Bank classification as reference, model (2) is estimated separately for 
two subsamples of countries: a) the subsample of high income countries and b) the 
subsample of medium and low income countries (see Appendix 1 for further details on 
the classification employed). 
 
The coefficients for our fiscal decentralization indicator in the last four columns of 
Table 2 reveal that the effect of fiscal decentralization on regional disparities differs 
clearly between developed and developing countries. As expected, in our low income 
country subsample the coefficient of the measure of fiscal decentralization is positive 
and statistically significant, pointing out that in these countries the processes of 
devolution of fiscal power from central to subnational governments contribute to greater  
regional inequality. This confirms the spatially regressive effects of fiscal 
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decentralization indentified by Prud’homme (1995), Dillinger (2002) or Rodríguez-Pose 
and Gill (2004, 2005). In contrast, in our high income subsample the coefficient of the 
subnational share in total government expenditure is negative and statistically 
significant, meaning that beyond a certain wealth threshold, the negative effects of fiscal 
decentralization no only tend to disappear, but also that under certain circumstances a 
greater transfer of resources to subnational tiers of government may – in accordance 
with the empirical evidence provided by Gil, Pascual and Rapún (2004) and Ezcurra and 
Pascual (2008) for a sample of OECD and EU countries respectively – contribute to 
greater economic convergence. 
 
Political decentralization is also disconnected from the evolution of regional disparities 
across the countries analysed. Whether regions have a greater political powers does not 
seem to make a difference for the evolution of economic disparities both in the whole 
sample and in the sub-sample of high income countries (Table 2). In contrast, in low 
income countries, the level of political decentralization appears to contribute to a 
reduction of the degree of spatial dispersion of the regional distribution of GDP per 
capita. The transfer of powers to subnational tiers of government in these countries may 
thus, after all, contribute to a perhaps greater dynamization of the local economic fabric 
and to mobilizing resources in areas that have possibly been operating well below their 
development potential. However, the inclusion of the political decentralization variable 
in Regression 6 (Table 2) does not affect the strength of the fiscal decentralization 
coefficient, which remains significantly stronger than that of political decentralization. 
This implies that the potentially positive effects of political decentralization for the 
evolution of regional inequality in parts of the developing world are more than 
cancelled out by the negative impact of the transfer of resources to implement 
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autonomous policies to governments that often lack the adequate capacity or have to 
function difficult economic, social, and institutional conditions. 
 
The inclusion of the remaining variables in model (2) does not affect the 
decentralization coefficients – confirming their robustness and showing that the effects 
of fiscal and political decentralization on spatial inequality discussed above are not  
spurious correlations resulting from the omission of relevant variables – and, by and 
large, tend to have the expected sign (Table 2). Of particular relevance given our 
starting hypotheses is the coefficient of public sector size. In the theoretical section we 
argued that in countries where the central government has a significant redistributive 
capacity the potentially negative effects of decentralization on regional disparities may 
be counterbalanced by the capacity of the central or federal state to channel resources 
and technical or political support to poorer subnational governments. In contrast, a lack 
of redistributive capacity would negatively affect the economic growth prospects of a 
poorer region when the resources of the local government are increasingly dependent on 
the local tax base or on their political bargaining capacity. The coefficients in Table 2 
for public sector size confirm this. There is a strong and highly significant negative  
relationship between the size of the public sector – our proxy for the redistributive 
capacity – of a country and regional disparities. This relationship is particularly strong 
in the developing world. However, the coefficient is not significant for the developed 
country sub-sample, indicating the potential existence of a threshold of public 
intervention on the evolution of regional disparities. 
 
Of the remaining variables included in model (2), Table 2 reveals that GDP per capita is 
in all cases positively correlated with regional disparities. Once we control for fiscal and 
 29 
political decentralization, public sector size, population, trade openness, and whether a 
country has undergone transition, country-wide advances in economic performance 
seem to be associated with greater spatial inequality. This suggests that the more 
dynamic regions over the study period were those initially more developed, underlining 
the spatially selective nature of the process of economic growth and the relevance in this 
context of agglomeration economies and increasing returns. Trade openness is, in 
contrast, not statistically significant in any of the samples considered, which is in line 
with the empirical evidence provided by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2006) for different 
countries. Note that this result does not mean that trade does not have spatial 
consequences: increasing trade will give rise to winning and losing regions. However, 
our finding suggest that on average the group of losing (winning) regions is not formed 
only by poor (rich) regions.  
 
The results also indicate that population size – once other factors are controlled for – is 
negatively correlated with regional disparities. Nevertheless, this should be met with 
caution, as the relationship is not statistically significant for the high income countries. 
Finally, the dummy variable for the CEE countries is positive and statistically 
significant in all cases, confirming that the transition countries registered on average 
greater regional disparities than the rest during the period of analysis, once other factors 
are controlled for.  
 
The results presented above may be affected by the choices subnational governments 
make about policies. Greater investment by regional governments in developing 
countries in economic affairs or other capital investments may result in greater 
territorial polarisation, as the more dynamic economic sectors are more concentrated in 
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the main cities in these countries than in the developed world. A greater appetite for 
expenditure in health, in social protection, or other types of welfare or current 
expenditure could, in contrast, limit the expansion of territorial inequalities. Given the 
generally more equal distribution of economic activity in developed countries, 
differences in policy choices by subnational governments may have a more nuanced 
effect – if at all – on regional inequalities.  
 
In order to demonstrate whether this is the case, we calculate the subnational share in 
total government expenditure on economic affairs, health, education, and social 
protection. As there are substantial differences among countries in their degree of 
devolution of fiscal power from central to regional and local governments, the different 
ratios of expenditure are weighted by the level of decentralization of total expenditure in 
each country. 
 
Table 3 shows the results obtained when model (2) is estimated replacing the indicator 
of fiscal decentralization employed so far with the four measures defined above6. As 
expected, across the developed world variations in expenditure choices tend to be 
completely dissociated from the evolution of regional disparities. The only exception is 
that a subnational government preference for health expenditure in high income 
countries is associated with a reduction in regional disparities. In contrast, in the low 






                                         
6
 Because of lack of full datasets on specific types of subnational expenditure, Brazil, 
Mexico, South Africa, and the United Kingdom had to be excluded from certain 




and medium income countries included in the sample the differences in policy 
preferences among subnational governments have important implications for regional 
disparities. In these countries, preferences for subnational public expenditure on 
economic affairs, education, and, contrary to expectations, social protection have a 
statistically significant impact on spatial inequality. The positive signs of the 
corresponding coefficients show that the decentralization of these expenditures is 
associated with increasing disparities (Table 3). Preferences for subnational expenditure 
in health are, on the contrary, associated with a reduction of regional disparities, not 
only in the subsample of developing countries, but in the whole sample as well. The 
decentralization of health expenditure thus contributes to reduce the degree of spatial 
dispersion of GDP per capita, regardless of the level of economic development of the 
countries under consideration. 
 
When weighing up the results obtained so far, it is worth gauging to what extent they 
depend on the specific measure we use to quantify the relevance of spatial inequality 
within the sample countries. Resorting to different inequality measures may actually 
yield different orderings of the distributions analysed, as each index has a different way 
of aggregating the information contained in the distribution (Sen, 1973).  
 
For this reason, and in order to supplement the information provided by the coefficient 
of variation, we calculate the population-weighted standard deviation of the logarithm 
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Both measures have been widely popular in the literature on personal income 
distribution and have been also used by numerous authors in order to analyse spatial 
disparities (e.g. Terrasi, 1999; Azzoni, 2001). As is the case with the coefficient of 
variation, all the indices selected are independent of scale and population size and, 
except for the standard deviation of the logarithm, they all fulfil the Pigou-Dalton 
transfer principle for the whole definition domain of income (Cowell, 1995). 
 
Table 4 summarizes the results obtained when model (2) is estimated again using as 
dependent variable v, (0)T  and (1)T  in turn, instead of the coefficient of variation. As 
can be observed, our previous findings still hold, confirming the robustness of the 
results discussed above. This means that the detected effects of fiscal decentralization 
on spatial inequality do not depend on the indicator used to quantify the degree of 
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dispersion in the regional distribution of per capita GDP within the different countries 




This paper has analysed the association between decentralization and regional 
inequalities across countries in the developed and the developing worlds. Although it is 
generally assumed that the transfer of powers and resources to subnational tiers of 
government may be detrimental for national economic cohesion, the results of our paper 
point that, across our sample of 26 countries, fiscal and political decentralization are 
completely disconnected from the evolution of regional disparities. This means that the 
institutional capacity, fiscal, and political constraints that the administrations of poorer 
regions may face with respect to that of wealthier, larger, or more powerful regions and 
states when greater autonomy is granted are likely to be offset by the greater capacity of 
governments in poorer areas to mobilise unexploited economic potential and to better 
tailor policies to the needs of local citizens, especially in areas that may have been 
ignored or considered a low priority for national policy intervention. The presence of a 
large national government with significant fiscal redistributive powers is another clear 
factor in reining the potentially negative effects of decentralization for peripheral areas. 
 
However, the association between decentralization and the evolution of regional 
inequalities varies significantly according to the level of development of the country. 
Our results highlight that in the developed world political decentralization does not 
affect the evolution of regional disparities, while fiscal decentralization may contribute 
to reducing them. In contrast, fiscal decentralization has in the past triggered a 
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significant rise in regional inequalities in the low income countries in our sample. This 
rise in inequalities cannot be compensated by the positive effects of political 
decentralization on regional disparities in these countries. As in most of these countries 
the redistributive capacity of the state is significantly weaker than in richer states, the 
potential for decentralization to have a detrimental effect on regional disparities rises 
significantly. 
 
Different policy choices by subnational governments in our developed world subsample 
tend not to matter for the evolution of regional disparities. Whether subnational 
governments choose to invest in economic affairs, education, or social protection does 
not affect territorial inequality. The only exception is expenditure in health, which is 
connected to a reduction in disparities. In the developing world, greater capital 
investment in areas such as economic affairs or education tends to favour the 
development of core areas to the detriment of the periphery. Health expenditure, in 
contrast, favours economic convergence, but investment in social protection – contrary 
to expectations – is also associated with an increase in regional inequality. 
 
The results of the paper highlight that the question of whether decentralization matters 
for territorial disparities may not be the most pertinent, but rather under which 
circumstances is decentralization likely to enhance or reduce regional inequality. The 
relationship between decentralization and the evolution of disparities at subnational 
level seems strongly affected by the level of wealth of a country, the dimension of its 
existing disparities, and the presence of solid fiscal redistribution systems. Hence, while 
high income countries, with limited internal disparities, a strong welfare state, and 
territorially progressive fiscal systems can expect that further decentralization will not 
 35 
harm their territorial cohesion (and, if anything, may increase it), low and medium 
income countries may have to tread more carefully as the potential positive effects of 
political decentralization on cohesion will be easily counterbalanced by the unequal 
capacity of regions in the core and in the periphery of these countries to make the most 
of decentralized resources, especially in the absence of well-established territorially 
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List of countries: 
 
High income countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
Low income countries: Brazil, Bulgaria, Mexico, Poland, Romania, South Africa, 
Thailand. 
 
These groups are based on the classification adopted by the World Bank according to 










Table 1: Spatial inequality and fiscal decentralization in the sample countries. 
  Spatial inequality Fiscal decentralization 
Country Period Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Australia 1990-2005 0.368 0.027 0.994 0.012 
Austria 1990-2004 0.859 0.011 1.081 0.014 
Belgium 1990-2004 1.295 0.008 1.129 0.020 
Brazil 1990-2004 1.674 0.021 1.126 0.060 
Bulgaria 1990-2004 0.645 0.040 0.582 0.039 
Canada 1990-2005 0.537 0.024 1.566 0.020 
Denmark 1990-2004 0.519 0.009 1.319 0.014 
Finland 1990-2004 0.578 0.013 1.245 0.027 
France 1990-2004 0.967 0.006 0.779 0.013 
Germany 1994-2004 0.748 0.004 1.670 0.047 
Hungary 1990-2004 1.193 0.071 0.745 0.020 
Ireland 1990-2004 0.552 0.023 0.705 0.024 
Italy 1990-2004 0.963 0.008 0.839 0.055 
Mexico 1993-2004 2.116 0.015 0.916 0.052 
Netherlands 1990-2004 0.454 0.012 0.966 0.021 
Norway 1990-2004 0.854 0.038 0.921 0.063 
Poland 1990-2004 0.715 0.041 1.318 0.186 
Portugal 1990-2004 1.043 0.020 0.382 0.015 
Romania 1990-2004 0.872 0.136 0.424 0.050 
South Africa 1995-2005 1.832 0.026 1.031 0.008 
Spain 1990-2004 0.761 0.007 1.150 0.068 
Sweden 1990-2004 0.639 0.020 1.092 0.033 
Switzerland 1990-2004 0.565 0.010 1.771 0.032 
Thailand 1994-2005 3.930 0.049 0.183 0.021 
United Kingdom 1990-2004 0.841 0.014 0.602 0.020 
United States 1990-2005 0.480 0.009 1.462 0.032 
Notes: Spatial inequality is measured using the population-weighted coefficient of variation of regional 
GDP per capita. The indicator of fiscal decentralization is in turn the subnational share in total 
government expenditure. The average levels of fiscal decentralization of the various countries are 
normalized according to the sample mean. 
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Table 2: The impact of fiscal decentralization on spatial inequality: regression analysis (IV method). 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.026*** 2.016*** 0.758 0.757 1.857** 1.911** 
 (0.567) (0.568) (0.824) (0.827) (0.528) (0.516) 
Fiscal decentralization: total expenditure 0.286 0.287 -0.268** -0.265** 0.512*** 0.511*** 
 (0.211) (0.212) (0.107) (0.109) (0.132) (0.130) 
Political decentralization  0.010  0.008  -0.095** 
  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.031) 
GDP per capita 0.921*** 0.919*** 0.705*** 0.704*** 1.319*** 1.342*** 
 (0.188) (0.187) (0.193) (0.194) (0.295) (0.280) 
Population -1.548** -1.544** 0.043 0.041 -2.057*** -2.065*** 
 (0.679) (0.681) (1.068) (1.070) (0.413) (0.396) 
Trade openness -0.050 -0.050 -0.047 -0.049 0.112 0.105 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.112) (0.114) (0.140) (0.145) 
Transition 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017) 
Public sector size -0.634** -0.635** -0.191 -0.194 -0.765*** -0.767*** 
 (0.231) (0.231) (0.169) (0.173) (0.064) (0.062) 
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.520 0.519 0.501 0.500 0.730 0.731 
Sample All countries All countries High income High income Low income Low income 
Number of countries 26 26 19 19 7 7 
Observations 354 354 263 263 91 91 
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the population-weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (see the main text for further details).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Decentralization of different types of expenditure and spatial inequality: regression analysis (IV method). 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.404** 0.693 2.811*** 2.259** 0.754 1.771 
 (0.876) (0.787) (0.497) (0.891) (0.827) (1.756) 
Decentral. of  economic affairs expenditure 0.069 -0.076 0.428**    
 (0.081) (0.062) (0.113)    
Decentral. of health expenditure    -0.078** -0.066** -0.100*** 
    (0.029) (0.024) (0.017) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.517 0.492 0.629 0.563 0.487 0.742 
Sample All countries  High income Low income All countries  High income Low income 
Number of countries 23 18 5 22 18 4 
Observations 305 249 56 303 249 54 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: See Table 2.  
 
Table 3 (continuation). 
Explanatory variables (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant 2.350*** 0.776 4.297*** 2.345** 0.933 1.839 
 (0.807) (0.846) (0.388) (0.835) (0.890) (1.267) 
Decentral. of education expenditure 0.151* -0.103 0.250***    
 (0.075) (0.072) (0.010)    
Decentral. of social protection expenditure    0.123 -0.004 0.245*** 
    (0.083) (0.033) (0.041) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.596 0.475 0.799 0.520 0.465 0.717 
Sample All countries  High income Low income All countries  High income Low income 
Number of countries 22 18 4 23 18 5 
Observations 303 249 54 298 248 50 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: See Table 2.  
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Table 4: Sensitivity of the results to the measure of spatial inequality: regression analysis (IV method). 
 
Dependent variable v T(0) T(1) 
Sample All  High income Low income All High income Low income All High income Low income 
Decen. of total expenditure 0.235 -0.259** 0.423*** 0.450 -0.525** 0.821*** 0.476 -0.453* 0.851*** 
 (0.165) (0.116) (0.111) (0.337) (0.219) (0.211) (0.340) (0.234) (0.220) 
Decen. of economic affairs expenditure 0.048 -0.073 0.342** 0.085 -0.154 0.655** 0.098 -0.148 0.693** 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.095) (0.133) (0.124) (0.153) (0.137) (0.127) (0.159) 
Decen. of health expenditure  -0.070*** -0.070** -0.077*** -0.164*** -0.131** -0.204** -0.166** -0.125** -0.215** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.005) (0.057) (0.047) (0.040) (0.063) (0.048) (0.049) 
Decen. of education expenditure  0.104 -0.101 0.190*** 0.239 -0.173 0.419*** 0.256 -0.209 0.445*** 
 (0.065) (0.077) (0.010) (0.140) (0.163) (0.043) (0.152) (0.141) (0.043) 
Decen. of social protection expenditure  0.102 -0.005 0.200*** 0.192 -0.018 0.374** 0.194 -0.004 0.390** 
 (0.067) (0.032) (0.028) (0.141) (0.068) (0.083) (0.147) (0.060) (0.090) 
Notes: All the regressions include the full set of control variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (see the main text for further details).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A1: Data sources. 
Variable Source Comments 
Regional GDP per capita Cambridge Econometrics and 
national statistics 
Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decentralization 
variables 
International Monetary Fund’s 
Government and Finance 
Statistics 
Time varying (annual) 
GDP per capita World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Time varying (annual) 
Trade openness World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Time varying (annual) 
Population World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Time varying (annual) 
Transition  World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Time invariant (dummy) 
Public sector size World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Time varying (annual) 
Political decentralization 
 
Schneider (2003) Time invariant (data for 1996) 
Note: See the main text for further details on the definition of the different variables. 
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